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 1. Introduction
The recent global economic crisis has caused renewed interest in the study of past
periods of economic decline. The current crisis that started in the United States be-
came a worldwide phenomenon. Small European countries have been affected, in-
cluding Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain. A recent article states that “The growing
fear is that the fallout from Greece and even Portugal — which together compose just
five percent of European economic activity — could be a mere sideshow if Spain, with
its much larger economy, has difficulty repaying its debt” (Thomas and Kulish, 2010).
This paper examines the history of Spanish economic crises with particular attention
to the effects of policies enacted by the government. The paper shows that govern-
ment budget deficits have contributed to repeated ‘boom – bust’ cycles. Examining
the Spanish economy from its pre-industrial period to the present, one observes re-
curring trends among the various crises.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a brief literature re-
view. Sections III and IV describe the economic crises of pre- and post-industrialized Spain,
respectively. Section V discusses the current Spanish financial crisis. Section VI concludes.
 2. Literature Review
The recent subprime mortgage crisis and its repercussions have stimulated renewed
interest in the study of other financial crises. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998)
and Laeven and Valencia (2008) identify crises by determining if one of several con-
ditions is met. These factors include the ratio of non-performing assets to total assets
in the banking system exceeding ten percent, the cost of a government rescue opera-
tion being at least two percent of GDP, banking sector troubles resulting in a nation-
alization of banks, or large bank runs.
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) show that generally, a multitude of weak economic fun-
damentals precede economic crises.  Bordo (2003) examines boom-bust cycles in both
the United States and abroad, and concludes that recessions originated in stock market
crashes are deepened only if there were already elements of financial instability (see also
Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel and Martinez-Peria, 2001; Bordo and Jeanne, 2002),
Garcia-Herrero and Del Rio (2003) use a sample of seventy-nine nations between 1970
and 1999 and find that when the objective of the central bank is price stability, the like-
lihood of a banking crisis is reduced.  Suarez and Ceron (2006) provide international
evidence on hot and cold housing markets.  Čihák (2007) shows that the more inde-
pendent the central bank is, the more stable the financial institutions are.
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Reinhart and Rogoff (2008, 2009a, 2009b) claim that parallels can be drawn between
crises in the United States and other countries. Boyd, Nicolo, and Loukoianova (2009)
question whether a “banking crisis” is actually a crisis in the banking system or just a
response to government interventionist policies. However, Klomp (2010) concludes
that there is no common factor that causes crises.
Economic and financial crises of the Spanish economy have been a subject of study for
many years. Harrison (1985) studies the Spanish economy in the twentieth century.
Lieberman (1982) investigates the growth and crises of the Spanish economy from 1940
to 1982. Lieberman (1995) updates his coverage of the Spanish economy for the period
ending in 1993. Harrison (1993) analyzes the era stretching from the Spanish civil war
to the Spain’s admission to the European community in the year 1986.
 3. Pre – Industrial Spain – Sixteenth Century to 1960s
Spain was a primarily rural, agrarian society from the sixteenth century through the first
few decades of the twentieth century. Its industrialization was delayed compared to
other Western European countries. It was only in the 1920s that the Spanish manufac-
turing output began to exceed agricultural output (Solsten and Meditz, 1988). Never-
theless, Spain had its share of financial woes, as early as the “Age of Exploration.1
3.1. The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries
The discovery of precious metals in the Americas marked one of the first periods of
dramatic growth in the Spanish economy.  A sudden increase in the supply of the pri-
mary forms of currency (gold and silver) led to prosperity and growth.  However, the
inflation that resulted from the discoveries was disregarded.  Individuals and entities
invested beyond their means.  The value of gold and silver fell, and Spain as a whole
defaulted on various debts in the early seventeenth century.  This, combined with the
significant spending and losses in war efforts against the Dutch and the French
throughout the seventeenth century, led to a series of defaults in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries (Reinhardt and Rogoff, 2008, p. 70-71).
3.2. Banking Crisis, 1846- 1847
Over two centuries later, Spain overcame default on external debt. However, the ex-
ternal debt led to a pattern of chronic defaults on banking obligations for many years.
In general, the average length of time a country spends in a state of sovereign default
is greater than the average time spent in financial crisis due to crippling effects on
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trade and investment (Reinhardt and Rogoff, 2008, p.148-9). One of the major bank-
ing crises of the nineteenth century occurred in 1846-1847 due to a conflict between
The Bank of Ferdinand and The Bank of Isabella II. The Spanish government created
the Bank of Isabella II to penalize the Bank of Ferdinand for its debt obligations due
to financing the opposition in the Peninsula War which lasted from 1807 to 1814.
However, eventually the two banks merged in 1844 and the Bank of Ferdinand as-
sumed the debts of Bank of Isabella II. The Bank of Ferdinand then relied on the state
to rectify shrinking cash reserves, embezzlement issues, rising loan demand, and cir-
culation increases. This crisis encouraged the Spanish government to form the new
Bank of Spain, modeled after the Bank of England, in 1847.
3.3. An Agricultural Crisis
In the nineteenth century, the Spanish countryside was suffering from an “agricultural
crisis” (Harrison, 1985, p. 17). Spanish industry at this time relied heavily on demand
generated by crop yields. Spanish farmers under the Latifundio (large estate) and
Minifundio (small farm) systems were allotted small plots of land which allowed for
only basic subsistence farming. Furthermore, a potato famine affected thousands of
people in 1850, and a Phyloxemia epidemic affected the wine industry in the 1870s
and the 1880s. Farmers also faced new competition from countries such as the United
States, where westward expansion encouraged a myriad of new agricultural activity.
There was limited government support by the Spanish monarchy for farmers or industry.
The population and economy as a whole was periodically burdened with unemployment
and poverty. Emilio Rui, a distinguished economist of the time, commented that Spain
did not match the development of other Western countries during WWI due to lack of
technical education, poor infrastructure, an ineffectual government and the extremely
defective organization of the Bank of Spain (Harrison, 1985, p. 35).
3.4. Insolvency of “Banco Central”
The regime of Miguel Primo de Rivera, from 1920 to 1930, laid the foundation for the
Spanish industrialization, by constructing the necessary infrastructure, mainly roads and
railroads, for development. The industrial sector was subsidized (Solsten  and Meditz,
1988). However, even though part of the spending was funded by income taxes, this pe-
riod was characterized by a significant budget deficit. Figure 1 shows the Spanish budget
surplus/deficits from 1909 to 1923 (Harrison, 1985, p. 43). The deficit increased from
147 million pesetas in 1913 to 1,103 million pesetas in 1921 – 1922.  The Finance Min-
ister Jose Calvo Sotelo was one of the main proponents of spending and reforms.  He
denied that the deficit existed, and disguised it by introducing various “extraordinary
budgets.”  The deficit nevertheless could not be ignored.  Between 1925 and 1927, 6,334
million pesetas of debt were floated, an increment of 75 percent (Harrison, 1985, p.
66). This resulted in steep inflation and the value of the Spanish currency dropped. Bank
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runs in 1924 led a number of banks to declare insolvency, including Banco Central, one
of the largest in Spain at the time (Feinstein, Temin, and Toniolo, 2008, p. 44). After the
downfall of de Rivera in 1930, most of the infrastructure plans were abandoned, due to
concern about rising inflation and a larger budget deficit (Harrison, 1993, p. 16).
 Figure 1. Spanish Government Budget Surplus / Deficits, 1909 - 1922 
(millions of pesetas)
source: harrison (1985, p. 43)  
3.5. Summary of the Spanish Economy Prior to the Great Depression
Before the Great Depression, the major economic crises that affected Spain can be
grouped into two types. At times, not enough government infrastructure and support
left citizens vulnerable to extreme ‘boom and bust’ cycles. This is evidenced by the agri-
cultural crisis in the mid -nineteenth century, and the unwillingness of the Spanish gov-
ernment to aid banks in the early twentieth century. However, excess government
involvement - especially when accompanied by large budget deficits - led to problems
because of the gold standard, and the need for substantial reserves and credibility. This
was apparent as early as the sixteenth century as evidenced by bank spending on the
Peninsular War and over-investing in infrastructure by the De Rivera Administration
from 1920 to 1930.
3.6. Spain during the Great Depression
The depression that struck most of the Western world shortly after World War I, con-
tinuing into the late 1930s, had a comparatively mild effect on the Spanish economy.
The decrease of production in Spain was significantly lower than in the other regions.
Scholars attribute this resilience to two factors. First, government raised wages in large
industries, ignoring the resulting inflation, in order to counter downturns in some sec-str
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tors of the economy. Second and more important, Spain was relatively inactive in in-
ternational trade. It did not rely on foreign demand and exchange rates as much as
other European countries (Harrison, 1985, p. 83, Bernanke and James, 1990).
Other notable factors that contributed to the lack of depth of the recession during
the worldwide Great Depression include a wave of immigration from Latin America
which helped boost agricultural labor and production, emigrant remittances, and re-
turns on foreign investment (Harrison, 1985, p. 85). Furthermore, Spain did not fol-
low a gold standard during this time, and the Bank of Spain could lend freely to
entities in need (Temin, 2008).
Table 1 shows the Spanish industrial production, compared with North America, Eu-
rope, and the rest of the world from 1929 to 1936. While there was a sharp drop of
almost twenty points in the index measuring industrial production in North America,
and a decline of around ten points in Europe, the Spanish production index only de-
creased by about two points. The Spanish economists Fontana and Nadal (1976)
noted that the main economic problems Spain faced during the Great Depression re-
sulted more from internal structural problems, especially in agriculture, than from
any external factors (see also Harrison, 1993, p. 16).
 Table 1. Industrial Production Indices, Spain vs. North America and Europe,
1929-1933
Year Spain North America Europe
1929 100 100 100
1930 98.6 80.9 91.6
1931 93.2 68.4 80.7
1932 88.4 54.4 70.2
1933 84.4 64.3 76.3
source: league of nations, statistical Yearbook, 1937 – 1938, “mineral anD inDustrial proDuction”
3.7. The Aftermath of the Spanish Civil War
The Spanish Civil War, which began in 1936, was a three-year struggle between the
Spanish army and the government under Manuel Azana. The period of 1936 to 1939
represented a protracted era of autarchy, a time of extreme protectionism leading to
stagnation, though protecting the domestic sectors had been an element of Spanish
economic policy since the end of the nineteenth century. The war was a monetary
burden financed by the sale of treasury bonds, the use of substantial gold reserves
from the Bank of Spain, and foreign aid from Germany and Italy under Hitler and
Mussolini, respectively (Harrison, 1985, p. 116).
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2 Francisco Franco was a Spanish military general and head of state of Spain from October, 1936 and de facto regent of the
nominally restored Kingdom of Spain from 1947 until his death in November 1975.
The conflict had debilitating and lasting consequences. The national income de-
creased by more than a quarter, falling from around 442,753 million pesetas from
1930 – 1935 to 328,647 pesetas in 1940 (Harrison, 1985, p. 117). The government
exhausted most of its reserves. The infrastructure of both industry and agriculture
was substantially damaged, decreasing productivity from 1939 on.
The outbreak of World War II (WWII) increased spending burdens on the economy,
and Spain entered a severe depression which lasted almost a decade (Solsten and
Meditz, 1988, p. 2). During and after WWII, Spain was characterized by high public
debt, economic stagnation and high inflation (Lieberman 1995, p. 26). Table 2
demonstrates the extent of the decline in the Spanish industry. From 1930 to 1931,
industrial production dropped around ten points and declined again by about four-
teen points from 1939 to 1940 (Lieberman, 1995, p. 18).
 Table 2. Spanish Industrial Production Index 
(Carreras) from 1929 – 1941
Year Spanish IPI
1929 100
1930 105.32
1931 94.45
1932 93.64
1933 92.58
1934 94.71
1935 97.86
1939
1940 93.92
1941 78.50
primarY source: carreras (1984).
seconDarY source: lieberman (1995, p. 18) 
The Spanish government under Francisco Franco2 responded to economic stagna-
tion by championing a wave of protectionism and self- reliance. The government
became increasingly involved in the private sector, passing in late 1939 the “Law of
Protection and Development of National Industry” and the “Law of Regulation and
Defense of National Industry.” The lack of imports under new regulations, however, 
led to shortages in raw materials, goods and services. Attempts to counter eco-
st
rin
g 
of
 D
ef
au
lts
: s
pa
ni
sh
 f
in
an
ci
al
 c
ris
es
 th
ro
ug
h 
th
e Y
ea
rs
. s
ha
ch
m
ur
ov
e, 
t. 
an
d 
 s
ha
ch
m
ur
ov
e, 
Y.
8
 
  
A E S T I M AT I O
  
nomic distress, such as overvaluing the peseta, and increased government spending, 
only worsened economic woes by raising inflation. Spain received credit of around
$264 million from Argentina towards the end of the 1950s, which helped with its
growing deficit, but a wave of criticism against autarky had already begun (Harrison
1985, p. 131, Bowen, 2006).
3.8. Rebellion against the Franco Regime
Although the 1950s was not a time of great economic liberalization, the Franco
regime did respond to the stagflation of the 1940s by lifting some of the constraints
on trade, and on the activities of firms, banks, and other entities. The response was
an economic “boom” characterized by growth in both agriculture and industry. Spain
also benefited greatly from aid provided by the United States.
In 1956, a series of events troubled the Franco administration. A sharp increase in
the cost of living caused strikes for higher pay. Wage increases and government in-
tervention then led to inflation. Inflation rose from 9.1 to 15.5 in one year (Harrison
1985, p. 138). In addition, cold weather at the time impacted farmers and workers
in rural Spain, who were receiving little government aid. Furthermore, the Spanish
gold reserves were falling, and there was a possibility of sovereign bankruptcy. In
an attempt to counter the growing crisis, the Franco government reexamined its
economic policy, creating government committees for economic affairs, transporta-
tion, and communication (Harrison 1985, p. 139). The Spanish multiple exchange
rate system was overturned. Interest rates were frozen to counter inflation, and new
tax reforms added additional government revenues. The 1959 reform was aimed at
both stabilizing the economy and reforming it. While the stabilization policy proved
successful, the reform did not. The opening of the economy to international trade
and finance, however, increased the rate of growth and led to a substantial rise in
the inflow of foreign investment.
3.9. The Spanish Economy from the Great Depression 
to Industrialization
From the establishment of government infrastructure in the 1920s until the 1960s,
there seems to be a general pattern. Excess government spending and substantial in-
tervention in the private sector, whether because of economic growth or because of
economic problems, have contributed to diminished reserves, decreased productivity,
and high inflation. These factors start or further aggravate crisis. The Spanish econ-
omy during and after the Spanish Civil War that lasted from 1936 to 1939, and during
the Franco administration, was in a far worse state than it was under the free-market
system of the 1950s. The basic infrastructure and the sound regulations of the 1950s
helped increased economic growth, and standards of living.
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 4. Spanish Economic Crises after the 
Spanish Industrial Revolution
While the world was entering a recession from the late 1960s to the middle of the
1970s, Spain was undergoing unprecedented economic growth. According the Bank
of Bilbao, as shown in Table 3, Spanish GDP increased at an annual rate of around
7.5% from 1961 to 1973 (Harrison, 1985, p. 144). Spain benefited from a free-
market economic structure, foreign aid, and currency remittances from Spanish cit-
izens abroad (Solsten and Meditz, 1988). Agricultural and industrial productivity
greatly increased with mechanization and technology. The prosperity persisted until
1975, the year of General Francisco Franco’s death.
 Table 3. Change in Spanish Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
from 1959–1973
source: harrison (1985, p. 144)
4.1. The Energy Crisis during the 1970s
The dramatic rise in oil prices in 1973 and 1979 had a great impact on the Spanish
economy. For some time, the consequences of increased oil prices was not given
due attention because of political concerns during the transition of governments
after the death of General Franco. Spain imported more than 70% of its energy
needs, especially from Middle Eastern countries (Solsten and Meditz, 1988, p. 6).
The increase in the price of a crucial resource reduced productivity across the Span-
ish economy. Demand for oil remained high, causing many entities to incur sub-
stantial losses. As a result, unemployment drastically increased, from 2.94% in 1974
to 17.06% of the labor force in 1982 (see Table 4). High oil prices also contributed
to a government budget deficit, which, as in previous crises depleted national re-
serves and led to high inflation.
st
rin
g 
of
 D
ef
au
lts
: s
pa
ni
sh
 f
in
an
ci
al
 c
ris
es
 th
ro
ug
h 
th
e Y
ea
rs
. s
ha
ch
m
ur
ov
e, 
t. 
an
d 
 s
ha
ch
m
ur
ov
e, 
Y.
10
 
  
A E S T I M AT I O
  
Year %Increase
1959 -2.5
1960 0.2
1961 11.4
1962 10.3
1963 6.6
1964 6.1
1965 6.3
1966 8.5
Year %Increase
1967 5.5
1968 6.5
1969 8.4
1970 5.9
1971 4.9
1972 8.4
1973 8.5
 Table 4. Percent of Labor Force Unemployed in Spain, 1974- 2011
source:  1974-1979 organization for economic co-operation anD Development (oecD) Database, 
1980-2011 the international monetarY funD WorlD economic outlook Database at
http://WWW.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/Weo/2010/01/WeoData/Weoselgr.aspx
*international monetarY funD (imf) staff estimates, last upDateD april 2010.
In the late 1970s, Spain joined the other “big five” nations, Norway, Finland, Sweden,
and Japan with banking crises caused by the shakedown of their most prominent credit
institutions (Thorvald, Solheim and Vale, 2004; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008, p. 27). The
Spanish government rescued twenty-four financial institutions between 1978 and 1983
(Caprio and Klingebiel, 2003). This placed an additional burden on its already depleting
reserves to about 16 percent of GDP (Vale, 2004). The remaining fifty-two banks in the
system also experienced solvency problems. The crisis fit a typical boom-bust pattern.
A boom in real housing prices was followed by a notable decline in years to follow. This
banking crisis confirmed that such crises in advanced economies from 1970-2001
tended to occur either at peak housing prices or right after a “bust,” as Bordo and
Jeanne (2002) note.
The recovery from the energy crisis in Spain was gradual, after the election of Felipe
Gonzalez.3 The new socialist government opted for “pragmatic, orthodox monetary
string of D
efaults: spanish financial c
rises through the Years. shachm
urove, t. and  shachm
urove, Y.
11
 
  
A E S T I M AT I O
  
Year % unemployed
1974 2.400
1975 3.500 
1976 4.500 
1977 5.200 
1978 6.900 
1979 8.600 
1980 11.011 
1981 13.755 
1982 15.770 
1983 17.215 
1984 19.937 
1985 21.305 
1986 20.907 
1987 20.223 
1988 19.238 
1989 17.240 
1990 16.238 
1991 16.313 
1992 18.353 
Year % unemployed
1993 22.640 
1994 24.118 
1995 22.900 
1996 22.080 
1997 20.610 
1998 18.605 
1999 15.640  
2000 13.873 
2001 10.553 
2002 11.474 
2003 11.480 
2004 10.970 
2005 9.160 
2006 8.513 
2007 8.263 
2008 11.327 
2009 18.010 
2010 19.400* 
2011 18.700* 
3 Felipe Gonzalez served as Prime Minister of Spain for four successive mandates from 1982 to 1996.  He remains the longest-
serving Prime Minister of Spain to date.
and fiscal policies” (Solsten and Meditz, 1988, p. 7) in order to quell inflation and
reduce the expanding budget deficit. Efficient energy policies were introduced, and
struggling government entities were eliminated. Once again, pragmatic and structured
government support helped reverse the economic crisis. As the price of oil stabilized,
tourism and foreign investment increased, and economic growth continued through
the 1980s (Solsten and Meditz, 1988).
4.2. The Crisis of the 1990s 
The rate of GDP growth of the Spanish economy began to slow from an annual rate
of 5.2% in 1988 to 4.8% in 1989, to 3.7% in 1990, and 2.5% in 1991 (Lieberman,
1995, p. 334). This deceleration of growth can be attributed to the allocation of
funds to consumer goods, rather than to investment, particularly in industry. 
Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, manufacturing industries used old business
models, and relied on the Spanish government to minimize global competition.
Consumers increased their purchases of foreign goods. Spanish exports decreased,
resulting in a larger trade deficit. Additionally, Spain had a government budget
deficit, and relied on other European countries for financing. The Spanish govern-
ment allocated funds to importing foreign goods and services, rather than investing
in domestic industries. Spain once again faced high inflation.
Some argue that until the appearance of the Popular Party in the mid- to late
1990s, Spain had a very weak “spirit of capitalism” (Lieberman, 1995, p. 339).
Once again, substantial government intervention, with policies that barred inno-
vation and did not contribute to productive investment, but to a growing budget
deficit, caused another, albeit mild, crisis. The economic policy of Rodrigo Rato,
the Minister of Economy and Finance between 1996 and 2004, advocated less gov-
ernment spending, and lower interest rates, to spur investment. These policies re-
versed the downward trend in annual growth of the Spanish GDP (Encyclopedia
of the Nations, Spain, 2007-2010).  This led the European Economic Advisory
Group (EEAG) to call the twelve years from 1995 until 2007, the Spanish “Golden
Decade” (EEAG, 2011).
 5. Spain and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis of 2007-2008
Spain had a major role in the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007, largely due to the
issuing of 40-year loan products. Unemployment more than doubled from almost
8.6 percent in the fourth quarter of 2007 (Banco de España, 2007) to 19.3 percent
by September of 2009 (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
2010). Relative to other twenty-seven European countries, Spain experienced astr
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sharp decline in construction from 2007 to 2009 (Figure 2). Similar to most coun-
tries that bought and sold subprime mortgages, the effects of the recession still
prevailed long after economists declared the recession over in late 2009. Like most
of the Western world, Spain used politically controversial stimulus measures un-
dertaken by the Bank of Spain. The aim was to increase lending and avoid an eco-
nomic contraction expected to ensue when the market eventually fell. The Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA, 2011) and the Brookings Institution (Prasad and Sorkin,
2009), estimate that the cost of the stimulus program in 2009 for Spain was about
5.7% of its GDP.
 Figure 2. Spanish Relative Construction in the 21st Century
source: instituto nacional De estaDística (ine) at:
http://WWW.ine.es/jaxi/tabla.Do?path=/t07/a081/e01/l1/&file=03002.px&tYpe=pcaxis&l=1
anD eurostat at: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/setupmoDifYtablelaYout.Do
Moody’s, the ratings agency, had announced at the time that it would consider reducing
its rating on over €16.9 billion Spanish mortgage-backed securities, to adjust for the
rising default rates and declining home values. Furthermore, Moody’s estimated that
the average Spanish homeowner had a debt-to-income ratio above the forty percent
benchmark recorded in 2005, which it deemed problematic (Hugh, 2008).
The Spanish economy bottomed out from its subprime mortgage crisis in the week of
March 2, 2009 (Figure 3). Spanish loans further rose in May of 2009 to €27.76 billion
or 1.5%, up from €12.05 billion relative to the 2008 baseline. The AAA rated Spanish
mortgage debt is considered to be the riskiest in Europe. Global investor demands for
the securities have soared from 85 basis points above Euribor (Euro Interbank Offered
Rate) in 2007 to 240 basis points above Euribor in mid-2008 (Hugh, 2008).
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 Figure 3. Spanish Subprime Market Plunge
source: Yahoo! finance at: http://au.finance.Yahoo.com/q/bc?s=^esDoWD&t=mY&l=on&z=l&q=l&c=
To further illustrate the crisis of the Spanish market, in the first half of 2008, retail
sales were down by 7.9 percent. The country launched an unsuccessful attempt to
stimulate the economy by requiring one million electric cars by the end of 2014
(Hugh, 2008), and by 2010 the deficit ran up to just short of 10 percent of GDP (CIA
World Factbook, 2011). Spain also imports all of its fossil fuel, making it more sus-
ceptible to inflationary risks. Thus the 5 percent inflation that occurred in early 2008,
followed by the burst of the property bubble in late 2008, and the decrease of stock
prices in early 2009, shifted concerns to the risk of deflation instead (Reuters, 2009).
A related theory for the mechanism behind the current Spanish crisis holds that the
entrance of Spain to the European Monetary Union led to low interest rates which
caused increased demand for construction and higher inflation. This combination
dampened self-corrective influences, leading to over-investment in construction and
the housing bubble which was doomed to burst (EEAG, 2011).
Some claim that the recent turmoil can be traced to 1970 and resulted from a combi-
nation of Spanish banks taking full advantage of loose monetary policy (Figure 4). Ad-
ditionally, Spanish economic growth was highly reliant upon the housing boom from
the late 1990s through 2007 (Figure 5). The European Central Bank (ECB) published
an examination of the average government debt-to-GDP ratio and the per-capita GDP
growth rate for several countries dating to 1970, including Spain (Checherita, 2010). str
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 Figure 4. Spanish Borrowing 1995-2007
source: imf at: http://WWW.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/surveY/so/2009/car042409b.htm
 Figure 5. Spanish Housing Prices 1995-2007
source: international monetarY funD (imf) at:
http://WWW.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/surveY/so/2009/car042409b.htm
This examination reveals the means through which government debt, both in absolute
levels and in rate of change, impacts economic growth including private saving, public
investment, total factor productivity, and sovereign long-term interest rates, both nom-
inal and real. Checherita, (2010) suggests that when debt rises above 90-100 percent
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of GDP, it harms growth. The debt Spain incurred through loans from the ECB dating
to 1970 clearly had an adverse effect on its economic growth.
The Spanish economy was particularly reliant upon construction. From 2003 to 2006,
annual percentage changes for construction and housing far exceeded all other sec-
toral demand for credit. During the same period, home purchases comprised the
largest annual percentage change for credit to individuals (Banco de España, 2008).
Once the ECB reversed its policy, recession set in, similarly to other member countries
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The pro-
ponents of this viewpoint maintain that reliance upon fiscal stimuli has resulted in
large public deficits and expanding debt. Rather than improve the economic condition
of Spain, that reliance has worsened it.
Spain has been struck during the crisis by extremely high levels of unemployment,
which have soared from around the European Union (EU) average to over twenty per-
cent (Figure 6). Some claim that this phenomenon is tied to its labor market structure
and overdependence on the construction sector. The importance and concomitant
fall of the Spanish construction sector led to notable unemployment levels, especially
among its young population, estimated to be as high as forty percent. The Spanish
economy finds itself restructuring away from construction, so that the job loss in this
sector is often permanent (EEAG, 2011).
 Figure 6. European Unemployment Rates
source: organization for economic co-operation anD Development (oecD) labour statistics (mei)
at: http://stats.oecD.org/inDex.aspx?DatasetcoDe=alfs_sumtab 
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Short-term contracts, which are beneficial in times of prosperity, are reversible in
times of crisis, leading to rapidly increasing unemployment. The temporary employ-
ment rate in Spain has exceeded thirty percent. This can be contrasted with France
where temporary employment has been around half that of Spain, hovering around
fifteen percent over the same period, since around 1992 (Bentolila et al., 2008). Prior
to the crisis France had a comparable total unemployment rate to that of Spain, but
its unemployment stayed below ten percent during the financial crisis, about in line
with the EU average, whereas the unemployment rate in Spain shot to about 20 per-
cent, double the one in France (Eurostat, 2011).
5.2. An Analysis of Crises in Modern Spain
The current financial crisis in Spain, along with crises of recent decades, is an inter-
esting fusion of trends. As with other economies, one could point to lax government
regulations, attesting that the lack of oversight contributed to risky methods of in-
vestment, which led to the crisis. However, government attempts to remedy the down-
turn of the housing market through aggressive policy were not effective. The Spanish
budget deficit is at the time of this writing, a source of international concern.
Moderate government spending in areas which foster investment buffers the econ-
omy and contributes to economic growth. The impact of excessive spending by the
Spanish government has implications for other countries, like the United States,
that have turned to government stimulus and lower interest rates as the means for
ending recessions.
The Spanish government is currently focusing on alleviating the impact of the crisis
by cutting taxes and extending unemployment benefits. The expanding budget
deficit, however, will eventually lead to higher taxes, lower government services and
reduced social benefits.
 6. Conclusion
Many factors contribute to financial crises, and to ‘boom bust’ cycles that are typ-
ical of a capitalist economy. However, some measures can and should be taken to
lessen the intensity of financial crises. Specifically, Spain needs to decrease its ex-
orbitant budget deficit. This deficit has contributed to inflation and to excessive
government control of the economy, stifling private investment and economic
growth. Prudent government involvement with limited regulations may prevent risky
ventures and investment. This is probably easier claimed than actually acted upon,
due to the extremely high unemployment rate that drives out Spain’s most talented
and skilled labor force.
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